shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration: yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or jargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with navigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their _starboard_ and _larboard_, because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. (_i_) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap. XII.: ‘_that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons_’: and cap. XVII. ‘that in questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): _The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets_.” ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIX. (_a_) “This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.” I never said the will is _compelled_, but do agree with the rest of the world in granting that it is _not compelled_. It is an absurd speech to say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel it. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will; but that is not a compelling of the _will_, but of the _man_. That which I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which was not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The necessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this distinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the question, _whether the will be free_, though it be to the question, _whether the man be free_.