excuse, but punish him for it: because neither was he necessitated by the temptation, and what strength it had was by his own fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had contracted of drinking or gaming: (James i. 14): _Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed_. Disordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and render it much greater. (_h_) “He talks much of the ‘motives to do and motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man’; as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes; as if the will had no power to move itself, but were merely passive, like an artificial popingay removed hither and thither by the bolts of the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are motives, but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and freely moved by the will? What are the will and the understanding, but faculties of the same soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting from them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much as to say that the agent is determined by himself. If there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsical necessitation at all. (_i_) All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with true liberty. But if T. H.’s opinion were true, that the will were naturally determined by the physical and special influence of extrinsical causes, not only motives were vain, but reason itself and deliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are vain. What needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already determined extrinsically what must be done?