_T. H._ The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or judgment, immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before, or not at all. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example: when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause: as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse’s back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needeth but the addition of that one to make the weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, _video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor_. But the saying, as pretty as it is, is not true. For though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all; and thereupon the wicked action followed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of two competitors said one had the better reasons, but the other must have the office: this also maketh against him. For the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this; that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that things nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason. What followeth thence but this; that the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to come? Fourthly, whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son, than for the sin of his soul: it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence, repentance proceedeth from causes.