(_i_) “The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a phantastical or imaginative reason: ‘How can a man imagine anything to begin without a cause; or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at this time, rather than at that time?’ He saith truly, nothing can _begin_ without a cause, that is _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of itself without any other cause. Nothing can _begin_ without a cause; but many things may _begin_ without a necessary cause.” He granteth nothing can _begin_ without a cause; and he hath granted formerly that nothing can cause itself. And now he saith, it may begin _to act_ of itself. The action therefore _begins to be_ without any cause, which he said nothing could do, contradicting what he had said but in the line before. And for that that he saith, that “many things may begin not without a cause, but without a necessary cause”; it hath been argued before; and all causes have been proved, if entire and sufficient causes, to be necessary. And that which he repeateth here, namely, that “a free cause may choose his time when he will begin to work”; and that “although free effects cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes, yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other”; it has been made appear sufficiently before that it is but jargon, the words _free cause_ and _determining themselves_ being insignificant, and having nothing in the mind of man answerable to them.