The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
_T. H._ For the seventh point, that all events have necessary causes, it
is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in
this place also suppose any event never so casual, as for example, the
throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of dice; and see if it must not have been
necessary before it was thrown. For, seeing it was thrown, it had a
beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it; consisting
partly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as the posture of the
party’s hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of
the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting
that was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast;
and consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it had not
been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it;
and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be
proved that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how
voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily; which is that J. D.
disputes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. Let the
case be put for example, of the weather. _It is necessary, that
to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not necessary
it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not
necessary that the proposition, _it shall rain or it shall not rain_,
should be true. I know there are some that say, it may necessarily be
true, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly, that it
shall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, one of them
is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary. And therefore, to seem
to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them
is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_. Which distinction either
signifies no more than this: one of them is true, but we know not which,
and so the necessity remains, though we know it not: or if the meaning
of the distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might as
well have said, one of them is true _tytyrice_, but neither of them
_tupatulice_.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]