(_f_) “And therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly be, but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_”. But it is a senseless assertion, whatsoever it deserve, to say that this proposition, it shall rain or not rain, is true _indeterminedly_, and neither of them true _determinedly_; and little better, as he hath now qualified it, “that it will infallibly be, though it be not yet determined whether it shall be or no”. (_g_) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give him one of his own kinds of proof, that is, an instance. That which necessitates all things, according to T. H. is the decree of God, &c.” His instance is, “that God himself made this necessitating decree, and therefore this decree, being an act _ad extra_, was freely made by God, without any necessitation”. I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the decrees of God have been from all eternity, and therefore he will not stand to this, that God’s decrees were ever made; for whatsoever hath been made, hath had a beginning. Besides, God’s decree is his will; and the Bishop hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the justice of God, God, &c. If therefore God made a decree, according to the Bishop’s opinion God made himself. By which we may see, what fine stuff it is that proceedeth from disputing of incomprehensibles. Again he says, “if it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some causes free from necessity; seeing that it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any contradiction”. If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his own prescience; which had been imperfection. Perhaps he will say, that in these words of his, _the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely made by God_, I take no notice of that _act ad extra_, as being too hot for my fingers. Therefore now I take notice of it, and say that it is neither Latin, nor English, nor sense. NO. XXXV. _T. H._ The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity; is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]