The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
_J. D._ “Though sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and
learning, because _by constant use they have their senses exercised to
discern both good and evil_ (Heb. v. 14), yet (_a_) solid and
substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments.
The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight
that is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without
passion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply
themselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success
with men of wit and learning. Those whose gold is true, are not afraid
to have it tried by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded,
T. H. hath another to shew as the causes of our errors, which he hopes
will prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by sight, he
seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy: _Fistula dulce canit,
volucrem dum decipit auceps_. As they who behold themselves in a glass,
take the right hand for the left, and the left for the right (T. H.
knows the comparison); so we take our own errors to be truths, and other
men’s truths to be errors, (_b_) If we be in an error in this, it is
such an error as we sucked from nature itself, such an error as is
confirmed in us by reason and experience, such an error as God himself
in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an error as the Fathers and
Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered, such an error wherein
we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, both natural and
moral, such an error as bringeth to God the glory of justice, and
wisdom, and goodness, and truth, such an error as renders men more
devout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent for
their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages, to dance
blindfold after his pipe? No, he persuades us too much to our loss. But
let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth,
because ‘we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as
seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom; but deny him such
poor things as eyes, ears, brains’; and so far, he saith ‘we do well.’
He hath reason, for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is,
the readiest way we have, is by removing all that imperfection from God,
which is in the creatures; so we call him infinite, immortal,
independent: or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in
the creatures, after a most eminent manner; so we call him best,
greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. (_c_) But saith he, ‘When
they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider them
again, as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them’.