To his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study, medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the same answer serves that to the former; that is to say, that this consequence, if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its cause, is a false one. And those things named, counsels, arts, arms, &c., are the causes of those effects. _J. D._ “Nothing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an argument. But I will put it into form for him. (_a_) The first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them. But supposing T. H’s opinion of the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing of them. The former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. Just laws are the ordinances of right reason; but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not the ordinances of right reason. Just laws are instituted for the public good; but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just laws do show unto a man what is to be done, and what is to be shunned; but those laws which prescribe impossibilities, do not direct a man what he is to do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evident. For if his opinion be true, all actions, all transgressions are determined antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of extrinsical causes. Yea, even the will of man, and the reason itself is thus determined. And therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing to be done, which is not done, or to be left undone which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibilities, and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. In all his answer there is not one word to this argument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, that ‘not the necessity, but the will to break the law makes the action unjust.’ I ask what makes the will to break the law; is it not his necessity? What gets he by this? A perverse will causeth injustice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. He saith, ‘the law regardeth the will, but not the precedent causes of action.’ To what proposition, to what term is this answer? He neither denies nor distinguisheth. First, the question here is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is likewise untrue. For first, that will which the law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth. It is a free will, not a determined necessitated will; a rational will, not a brutish will. Secondly, the law doth look upon precedent causes, as well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before he be seven years old or have the use of reason, in some childish quarrel do willingly stab another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the law