Secondly, he says, that usually in Euclid, and all after him, by _infinite_ is meant but, more than any assignable _finite_, or the greatest possible. I am content it be so interpreted. But then from thence he must demonstrate those his conclusions, which he hath not yet done. And when he shall have done it, not only the conclusions, but also the demonstration, will be the same with mine in Cap. XIV. Art. 2, 3, &c. of my book _De Corpore_. And so he steals what he once condemned. A fine quality. Thirdly, he says, (by Euclid’s tenth proposition, but he tells not of what book), that a line may be bisected, and the halves of it may again be bisected, and so onwards infinitely; and that upon such supposed section infinitely continued, the parts must be supposed infinitely many. I deny that; for Euclid, if he says a line may be divisible into parts perpetually divisible, he means that all the divisions, and all the parts arising from those divisions, are perpetually finite in number. Fourthly, he says, that there may be supposed a row of quantities infinitely many, and continually increasing, whereof the last is given. It is true, a man may say, (if that be supposing) that white is black: but, if _supposing_ be _thinking_, he cannot suppose an infinite row of quantities whereof the last is given. And if he say it, he can demonstrate nothing from it. Fifthly, he says (for one absurdity begets another) _that a superficies or solid may be supposed so constituted as to be_ infinitely long, _but_ finitely great, _(the breadth continually decreasing in greater proportion than the length increaseth), and so as to have no centre of gravity. Such is Toricellio’s Solidum Hyperbolicum acutum, and others innumerable, discovered by Dr. Wallis, Monsieur Fermat, and others. But, to determine this, requires more of geometry and logic, (whatsoever it do of the Latin tongue), than Mr. Hobbes is master of._ I do not remember this of Toricellio, and I doubt Dr. Wallis does him wrong and Monsieur Fermat too. For, to understand this for sense, it is not required that a man should be a geometrician or a logician, but that he should be mad. In the next place, he puts to me a question as absurd as his answers are to mine. Let him ask himself, saith he, if he be still of opinion, _that there is no argument in natural philosophy to prove that the world had a beginning_. First, whether, in case it had no beginning, there must not have passed an infinite number of years before Mr. Hobbes was born. Secondly, whether, at this time, there have not passed more, that is, more than that infinite number. Thirdly, whether, in that infinite (or more than infinite) number of years, there have not been a greater number of days and hours, and of which, hitherto, the last is given. Fourthly, whether, if this be an absurdity, we have not then, (contrary to what Mr. Hobbes would persuade us), an argument in nature to prove the world had a beginning.