A Treatise of Human Nature — David Hume — John Shaqi
A Treatise of Human Nature
David Hume · en
As to those, who imagine, that extension is divisible in infinitum, it
is impossible they can make use of this answer, or fix the equality of
any line or surface by a numeration of its component parts. For since,
according to their hypothesis, the least as well as greatest figures
contain an infinite number of parts; and since infinite numbers,
properly speaking, can neither be equal nor unequal with respect to each
other; the equality or inequality of any portions of space can never
depend on any proportion in the number of their parts. It is true, it
may be said, that the inequality of an ell and a yard consists in the
different numbers of the feet, of which they are composed; and that of
a foot and a yard in the number of the inches. But as that quantity we
call an inch in the one is supposed equal to what we call an inch in
the other, and as it is impossible for the mind to find this equality by
proceeding in infinitum with these references to inferior quantities: it
is evident, that at last we must fix some standard of equality different
from an enumeration of the parts.
There are some[5], who pretend, that equality is best defined by
congruity, and that any two figures are equal, when upon the placing of
one upon the other, all their parts correspond to and touch each other.
In order to judge of this definition let us consider, that since
equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the
figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison, which the
mind makes betwixt them. If it consists, therefore, in this imaginary
application and mutual contact of parts, we must at least have a
distinct notion of these parts, and must conceive their contact. Now it
is plain, that in this conception we would run up these parts to the
greatest minuteness, which can possibly be conceived; since the contact
of large parts would never render the figures equal. But the minutest
parts we can conceive are mathematical points; and consequently this
standard of equality is the same with that derived from the equality of
the number of points; which we have already determined to be a just but
an useless standard. We must therefore look to some other quarter for a
solution of the present difficulty.
[5] See Dr. Barrow's mathematical lectures.
There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of
equality, but assert, that it is sufficient to present two objects, that
are equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion. All
definitions, say they, are fruitless, without the perception of such
objects; and where we perceive such objects, we no longer stand in need
of any definition. To this reasoning, I entirely agree; and assert, that
the only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is derived from the
whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects.