299. The comparison is between present and past experience of succession of objects. 300. Observation of succession already goes beyond sense. 301. As also does the ‘observation concerning identity,’ which the comparison involves. 302. Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume. His account of it. 303. Properly with him it is a fiction, in the sense that we have no such idea. Yet he implies that we have such idea, in saying that we mistake something else for it. 304. Succession of like feelings mistaken for an identical object: but the feelings, as described, are already such objects. 305. Fiction of identity thus implied as source of the propensity which is to account for it. 306. With Hume continued existence of perceptions a fiction different from their identity. Can perceptions exist when not perceived? 307. Existence of objects, distinct from perceptions, a further fiction still. 308. Are these several ‘fictions’ really different from each other? 309. Are they not all involved in the simplest perception? 310. Yet they are not possible ideas, because copied from no impressions. 311. Comparison of present experience with past, which yields relation of cause and effect, pre-supposes judgment of identity; 312. ... without which there could be no recognition of an object as one observed before. 313. Hume makes conceptions of identity and cause each come before the other. Their true correlativity. 314. Hume quite right in saying that we do not go _more_ beyond sense in reasoning than in perception. 315. How his doctrine might have been developed. Its actual outcome. 316. No philosophical relation admissible with Hume that is not derived from a natural one. 317. Examination of his account of cause and effect as ‘natural relation’. 318. Double meaning of natural relation. How Hume turns it to account. 319. If an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence, how can an event be an effect the first time it is observed? Hume evades this question; 320. Still, he is a long way off the Inductive Logic, which supposes an objective sequence. 321. Can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived from sequence of feelings? 322. With Hume the only uniformity is in expectation, as determined by habit; but strength of such expectation must vary indefinitely. 323. It could not serve the same purpose as the conception of uniformity of nature. 324. Hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account of the ‘remembrance’ which determines it. Bearing of his doctrine of necessary connexion upon his argument against miracles. This remembrance, as he describes it, supposes conception of a system of nature. 326. This explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objective character to causation. 327. Reality of remembered ‘system’ transferred to ‘system of judgment’. 328. Reality of the former ‘system’ other than vivacity of impressions.