An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding — David Hume — John Shaqi
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume · English
[16] According to these explications and definitions, the idea
of _power_ is relative as much as that of _cause;_ and both
have a reference to an effect, or some other event constantly
conjoined with the former. When we consider the _unknown_
circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of
its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And
accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect
is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power,
as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself?
The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its
velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say,
need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or
unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison.
As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c.,
which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in
philosophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any
instance, with the connecting principle between cause and
effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one
thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very
loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very
uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in
motion without the sentiment of a _nisus_ or endeavour; and
every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow
of an external object, that is in motion. These sensations,
which are merely animal, and from which we can _à priori_ draw
no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and
to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they
transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are
exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated
motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction
of the events; and as we _feel_ a customary connexion between
the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing
is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal
sensation, which they occasion.