Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author — David Hume — John Shaqi
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
The _second_ quality which I discover in these passions, and which
I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or
the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute
their very being and essence. Thus, pride is a pleasant sensation, and
humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain,
there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling
convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or
dispute.
If I compare therefore these two _established_ properties of the
passions, viz. their object, which is self, and their sensation, which
is either pleasant or painful, to the two _supposed_ properties of the
causes, viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a
pain or pleasure independent of the passion; I immediately find, that
taking these suppositions to be just, the true system breaks in upon me
with an irresistible evidence. That cause, which excites the passion,
is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion;
the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to
the sensation of the passion: from this double relation of ideas and
impressions, the passion is derived. The one idea is easily converted
into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles
and corresponds to it: with how much greater facility must this
transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other,
and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its
impressions and ideas!
That we may comprehend this the better, we must suppose that nature
has given to the organs of the human mind a certain disposition fitted
to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call _pride_:
to this emotion she has assigned a certain idea, viz. that of _self_,
which it never fails to produce. This contrivance of nature is easily
conceived. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs.
The nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed, as in certain
circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: the
sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those
peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite. These two
circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so disposed as to
produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally
produces a certain idea. All this needs no proof. 'Tis evident we never
should be possessed of that passion, were there not a disposition of
mind proper for it; and 'tis as evident, that the passion always turns
our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and
circumstances.