Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
But here there occurs a considerable objection, which 'twill be
necessary to examine before we proceed any farther. I have endeavoured
to prove that power and riches, or poverty and meanness, which give
rise to love or hatred, without producing any original pleasure or
uneasiness, operate upon us by means of a secondary sensation derived
from a sympathy with that pain or satisfaction which they produce in
the person who possesses them. From a sympathy with his pleasure there
arises love; from that with his uneasiness, hatred. But 'tis a maxim
which I have just now established, and which is absolutely necessary
to the explication of the phenomena of pity and malice, "That 'tis not
the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure which determines
the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it
from the beginning to the end." For this reason, pity or a sympathy
with pain produces love, and that because it interests us in the
fortunes of others, good or bad, and gives us a secondary sensation
correspondent to the primary, in which it has the same influence with
love and benevolence. Since, then, this rule holds good in one case,
why does it not prevail throughout, and why does sympathy in uneasiness
ever produce any passion beside good will and kindness? Is it becoming
a philosopher to alter his method of reasoning, and run from one
principle to its contrary, according to the particular phenomenon which
he would explain?
I have mentioned two different causes from which a transition of
passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions,
and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction
of any two desires which arise from different principles. Now I
assert, that when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces
hatred or contempt by the former cause; when strong, it produces love
or tenderness by the latter. This is the solution of the foregoing
difficulty, which seems so urgent; and this is a principle founded on
such evident arguments, that we ought to have established it, even
though it were not necessary to the explication of any phenomenon.