The History of England in Three Volumes, Vol. I., Part C.: From Henry VII. to Mary
David Hume · en
They said that the interests of Scotland had too long been sacrificed to
those of the French nation, who, whenever they found themselves reduced
to difficulties, called for the assistance of their allies; but were
ready to abandon them as soon as they found their advantage in making
peace with England: that where a small state entered into so close a
confederacy with a greater, it must always expect this treatment, as
a consequence of the unequal alliance; but there were peculiar
circumstances in the situation of the kingdoms, which, in the present
case, rendered it inevitable: that France was so distant, and so divided
from them by sea, that she scarcely could, by any means, and never could
in time, send succors to the Scots, sufficient to protect them against
ravages from the neighboring kingdom: that nature had, in a manner,
formed an alliance between the two British nations; having enclosed them
in the same island; given them the same manners, language, laws, and
form of government; and prepared every thing for an intimate union
between them: and that, if national antipathies were abolished, which
would soon be the effect of peace, these two kingdoms, secured by the
ocean and by their domestic force, could set at defiance all foreign
enemies, and remain forever safe and unmolested.
The partisans of the French alliance, on the other hand, said, that the
very reasons which were urged in favor of a league with England, the
vicinity of the kingdom and its superior force, were the real causes
why a sincere and durable confederacy could never be formed with that
hostile nation: that among neighboring states occasions of quarrel were
frequent, and the more powerful would be sure to seize every frivolous
pretence for oppressing the weaker, and reducing it to subjection: that
as the near neighborhood of France and England had kindled a war almost
perpetual between them, it was the interest of the Scots, if they wished
to maintain their independence, to preserve their league with the former
kingdom, which balanced the force of the latter: that if they deserted
that old and salutary alliance on which their importance in Europe
chiefly depended, their ancient enemies, stimulated both by interest and
by passion, would soon invade them with superior force, and bereave them
of all their liberties: or if they delayed the attack, the insidious
peace, by making the Scots forget the use of arms, would only prepare
the way for a slavery more certain and more irretrievable.[*]
* Buchanan, lib. xiv.