The History of England in Three Volumes, Vol. I., Part E.: From Charles I. to Cromwell — David Hume — John Shaqi
The History of England in Three Volumes, Vol. I., Part E.: From Charles I. to Cromwell
David Hume · en
The two ruling passions of this parliament were, zeal for liberty, and
an aversion to the church; and to both of these, nothing could appear
more exceptionable than the court of high commission, whose institution
rendered it entirely arbitrary, and assigned to it the defence of the
ecclesiastical establishment. The star chamber also was a court which
exerted high discretionary powers and had no precise rule or limit,
either with regard to the causes which came under its jurisdiction, or
the decisions which it formed. A bill unanimously passed the houses to
abolish these two courts; and in them to annihilate the principal and
most dangerous articles of the king's prerogative. By the same bill,
the jurisdiction of the council was regulated, and its authority
abridged.[*] Charles hesitated before he gave his assent. But finding
that he had gone too far to retreat, and that he possessed no resource
in case of a rupture, he at last affixed the royal sanction to this
excellent bill. But to show the parliament that he was sufficiently
apprised of the importance of his grant, he observed to them, that this
statute altered in a great measure the fundamental laws, ecclesiastical
and civil, which many of his predecessors had established.[**]
* Clarendon, vol. i. p. 283, 284. Whitlocke, p. 47. Rush.
vol. iii. p. 1383, 1384.
** Rush. vol. v. p. 30.
By removing the star chamber, the king's power of binding the people by
his proclamations was indirectly abolished; and that important branch of
prerogative, the strong symbol of arbitrary power, and unintelligible
in a limited constitution, being at last removed, left the system of
government more consistent and uniform. The star chamber alone was
accustomed to punish infractions of the king's edicts: but as no courts
of judicature now remained except those in Westminster Hall, which take
cognizance only of common and statute law, the king may thenceforth
issue proclamations, but no man is bound to obey them, It must, however,
be confessed, that the experiment here made by the parliament was not a
little rash and adventurous. No government at that time appeared in the
world, nor is perhaps to be found in the records of any history, which
subsisted without the mixture of some arbitrary authority committed to
some magistrate; and it might reasonably, beforehand, appear doubtful,
whether human society could ever reach that state of perfection, as to
support itself with no other control than the general and rigid maxims
of law and equity. But the parliament justly thought, that the king was
too eminent a magistrate to be trusted with discretionary power, which
he might so easily turn to the destruction of liberty. And in the event,
it has hitherto been found, that, though some sensible inconveniencies
arise from the maxim of adhering strictly to law, yet the advantages
overbalance them, and should render the English grateful to the memory