=How is metaphysics as a science possible?=[297]--We may now consider how this and the three preceding questions are related to one another and to the various divisions of the _Critique_.[298] The four subordinate questions within the main problem--How are synthetic _a priori_ judgments possible?--are here stated by Kant as: 1. =How is pure mathematics possible?= 2. =How is pure natural science possible?= 3. =How is metaphysics as natural disposition possible?= 4. =How is metaphysics as science possible?= There is little difficulty as regards 1 and 2. The first is dealt with in the _Aesthetic_, and the second[299] in the _Analytic_, though, owing to the complexity of the problems, the _Aesthetic_ and _Analytic_ are wider than either query, and cannot be completely separated. Applied mathematics is dealt with in the _Analytic_ as well as in the _Aesthetic_, and in both the determination of the limits of scientific knowledge is equally important with that of accounting for its positive acquisitions. The third and fourth questions raise all manner of difficulties. Notwithstanding the identical mode of formulation, they do not run on all fours with the two preceding. The first two are taken as referring to actually existing and valid sciences. It is the ground of their _objective validity_ that is sought. But what is investigated in the third question falsely lays claim to the title of science; we can enquire only as to the ground of its _subjective_ possibility. In the fourth question, the problem takes still another form. Kant now seeks to determine _whether_ a new, not yet existing, science of metaphysics is possible, and _in what manner_ it can be validly constructed. The manifoldness of the problems is thus concealed by the fixity of the common formula.[300] Now with what divisions of the _Critique_ are the two last questions connected? It has been suggested[301] that the third question is dealt with in the _Dialectic_ and the fourth in the _Methodology_, the four questions thus corresponding to the four main divisions of the _Critique_. But this view is untenable, especially in its view of the fourth question. The division of the _Critique_ is by dichotomy into _doctrine of elements_ and _doctrine of methods_, the former including the _Aesthetic_ and _Logic_, and the _Logic_ being again divided into _Analytic_ and _Dialectic_. Its problems stand in an equally complex subordination; they cannot be isolated from one another, and set merely side by side. Secondly, it has been maintained[302] that the third question is dealt with in the introduction to the _Dialectic_ (in its doctrine of Ideas), and the fourth in the _Dialectic_ proper. This view is fairly satisfactory as regards the third question, but would involve the conclusion that the fourth question refers only to transcendent metaphysics, and that it therefore receives a negative answer. But that is not Kant’s view of metaphysics _as a science_. The