In terms of the first distinction we are compelled to recognise that the view of space which underlies the _Aesthetic_ is out of harmony with the teaching of the _Analytic_. In the _Aesthetic_ Kant interprets space not merely as a form of intuition but also as a formal intuition, which is given complete in its totality, and which is capable of being apprehended independently of its empirical contents, and even prior to them. That would seem to be the view of space which is presupposed in Kant’s explanation of pure mathematical science. The passages from the _Analytic_, quoted above, are, however, its express recantation. Space, as the intuition of a manifold, is a _totum syntheticum_, not a _totum analyticum_. It is constructed, not given. The divergence of views between the _Aesthetic_ and the _Analytic_ springs out of the difficulty of meeting at once the logical demands of a world which Kant conceives objectively, and the psychological demands which arise when this same world is conceived as subjectively conditioned. In principle, the whole precedes the parts; in the process of being brought into existence as an intuition, the parts precede the whole. The principle which determines our apprehension of any space, however small or however large, is that it exists in and through universal space. This is the principle which underlies both the synthetic construction of space and also its apprehension once it is constructed. In principle, therefore, _i.e._ in the order of logical thought, the whole precedes the parts.[413] The process, however, which this principle governs and directs, cannot start with space as a whole, but must advance to it through synthesis of smaller parts. But Kant does not himself recognise any conflict between this teaching and the doctrine of the _Aesthetic_. He seems to himself merely to be making more definite a position which he has consistently held all along; and this was possible owing to his retention and more efficient formulation of the second of the two distinctions mentioned above, viz. that between the manifold of sense and the manifold of intuition. This distinction enables him to graft the new view upon the old, and so in the very act of insisting upon the indispensableness of the conceptual syntheses of understanding, none the less to maintain his view of geometry as an intuitive science.[414] “Space and time contain a manifold of pure _a priori_ intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind--conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must also affect the concept of them. But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thinking requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This action I name synthesis.... Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is not empirical, but is given _a priori_, as is that of space and of time.”[415]