(_b_) The main argument rests upon and presupposes a very definite view as to the manner in which alone, according to Kant, concepts are formed. Only if this view be granted as true of all concepts without exception is the argument cogent. This doctrine[500] of the concept is accordingly stated by Kant in the words of the parenthesis. The partial representations, _i.e._ the different properties which go to constitute the object or content conceived, precede the representation of the whole. “The aggregation of co-ordinate attributes (_Merkmale_) constitutes the totality of the concept.”[501] Upon the use which Kant thus makes of the traditional doctrine of the concept, and upon its lack of consistency with his recognition of relational categories, we have already dwelt.[502] =Third Argument and the Transcendental Exposition.=--The third argument ought to have been omitted in the second edition, and its substance incorporated in the new transcendental exposition, as was done with the corresponding argument concerning space. The excuse which Kant offers for not making the change, namely, his desire for brevity, is not valid. By insertion in the new section the whole matter could have been stated just as briefly as before. The purpose of the transcendental exposition has been already defined. It is to show how time, when viewed in the manner required by the results of the metaphysical deduction, as an _a priori_ intuition, renders synthetic _a priori_ judgments possible. This exposition, as it appears in the third argument of the first edition, grounds the apodictic character of two axioms in regard to time[503] on the proved apriority of the representation of time, and then by implication finds in these axioms a fresh proof of the apriority of time.