“Though time has only one dimension, yet the _ubiquity_ of time (to employ Newton’s term), through which all things sensuously thinkable are _at some time_, adds another dimension to the quantity of actual things, in so far as they hang, as it were, upon the same point of time. For if we represent time by a straight line extended to infinity, and simultaneous things at any point of time by lines successively erected [perpendicular to the first line], the surface thus generated will represent the _phenomenal world_ both as to substance and as to accidents.” Similarly in A 182 = B 226 of the _Critique_ Kant states that simultaneity is not a mode of time,[534] since none of the parts of time can be simultaneous, and yet also teaches in A 177 = B 219 that, as the order of _appearances_, time possesses in addition to succession the two modes, duration and simultaneity. The significance of this distinction between time as the order of our inner states, and time as the order of objective appearances, we shall consider immediately. A connected question is as to whether or not Kant teaches the possibility of simultaneous apprehension. In the _Aesthetic_ and _Dialectic_ he certainly does so. Space is given as containing coexisting parts, and[535] can be intuited as such without successive synthesis of its parts. In the _Analytic_, on the other hand, the opposite would seem to be implied.[536] The apprehension of a manifold can only be obtained through the successive addition or generation of its parts. (_c_) Lastly, Kant argues that the fact that all the relations of time can be expressed in an outer intuition is proof that the representation of time is itself intuition. But surely if, as Kant later taught, time can be apprehended at all only in and through space, that, taken alone, would rather be a reason for denying it to be itself intuition. In any case it is difficult to follow Kant in his contention that the intuition of time is similar in general character to that of space.[537] =Third Paragraph (Conclusion c).=--Kant now reopens the question as to the relation in which time stands to outer appearances. As already noted, he has argued in the beginning of the previous paragraph that it cannot be a determination of outer appearances, but only of representations in our inner state. External appearances, however, as Kant recognises, can be known only in and through representations. To that extent they belong to inner sense, and consequently (such is Kant’s argument) are themselves subject to time. Time, as the immediate condition of our representations, is also the mediate condition of appearances. Therefore, Kant concludes, “all _appearances_, _i.e._ all _objects_ of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in time-relations.”