That everything represented in time, like that which is represented in space, consists solely of relations, Kant does not, however, attempt to prove. He is satisfied with repeating the conclusion reached in the first edition of the _Aesthetic_, that, as time is the object of a sense, it must of necessity be appearance. This, like everything which Kant wrote upon inner sense, is profoundly unsatisfactory. The obscurities of his argument are not to be excused on the ground that “the difficulty, how a subject can have an internal intuition of itself, is common to every theory.” For no great thinker,[585] except Locke, has attempted to interpret inner consciousness on the analogy of the senses. Discussion of the doctrine must meantime be deferred.[586] =III. B 69.=--Kant here formulates the important distinction between appearance (_Erscheinung_) and illusion (_Schein_). The main text is clear so far as it goes; but the appended note is thoroughly confused. Together they contain no less than three distinct and conflicting views of illusion.[587] According to the main text, _Schein_ signifies a representation, such as may occur in a dream, to which nothing real corresponds. _Erscheinung_, on the other hand, is always the appearance of a _given_ object; but since the qualities of that object depend solely on our mode of intuition, we have to distinguish the object as appearance from the object as thing in itself. ”[Every appearance] has two sides, the one by which the object is viewed in and by itself, ... the other by which the form of the intuition of the object is taken into account....”[588] Obviously, when illusion is defined in the above manner, the assertion that objects in space are mere appearances cannot be taken as meaning that they are illusory.