In the interval between the _Prolegomena_ (1783) and the second edition of the _Critique_ (1787) Mendelssohn had published (1785) his _Morgenstunden_. In its introduction, entitled _Vorerkenntniss von Wahrheit, Schein und Irrthum_,[594] he very carefully distinguishes between illusion (_Sinnenschein_) and error of judgment (_Irrthum_). This introduction Kant had read. In a letter to Schütz[595] he cites it by title, and praises it as “acute, original, and of exemplary clearness.” It is therefore the more inexcusable that he should again in the second edition of the _Critique_ have confused these two so radically different meanings of the term _Schein_. Mendelssohn, however, drew no distinction between _Schein_ and _Erscheinung_. They were then used as practically synonymous,[596] though of course _Schein_ was the stronger term. Kant seems to have been the first to distinguish them sharply and to attempt to define the one in opposition to the other. But the very fact that _Erscheinung_ and _Schein_ were currently employed as equivalent terms, and that the distinction, though one of his own drawing, had been mentioned only in the most cursory manner in the first edition of the _Critique_,[597] removes all justification for his retort upon his critics of “unpardonable misconception.” His anger was really due, not to the objection in itself, but to the implied comparison of his position to that of Berkeley. Such comparison never failed to arouse Kant’s wrath. For however much this accusation might be justified by his own frequent lapses into subjectivism of the most extreme type, even its partial truth was more than he was willing to admit. Berkeley represents in his eyes, not merely a subjectivist interpretation of the outer world, but the almost diametrical opposite of everything for which he himself stood. Discussion of Kant’s relation to Berkeley had best, however, be introduced through consideration of the passage immediately following in which Kant refers to Berkeley by name.