“I propounded to myself this question: on what ground rests the relation of that in us which we name representation (_Vorstellung_) to the object. If the representation contains only the mode in which the subject is affected by the object, it is easily understood how it should accord (_gemäss sei_) with that object as an effect with its cause, and how [therefore] this determination of our mind should be able to _represent_ something, _i.e._ have an object. The passive or sensuous representations have thus a comprehensible (_begreifliche_) relation to objects, and the principles, which are borrowed from the nature of our soul, have a comprehensible validity for all things in so far as they are to be objects of the senses.”[761] Thus in 1772 there was here no real problem for Kant. The assumed fact, that our representations are generated in us by the action of independent existences, is taken as sufficient explanation of their being referred to objects. The section of the _Critique_ under consideration shows that Kant had come to realise the inadequacy of this explanation quite early, indeed prior to his solution of the second and further question which in that same letter is spoken of as “the key to the whole secret” of metaphysics. On what grounds, he now asks, is a subjective idea, _even though it be a sense impression_, capable of yielding consciousness of an object? In the letter to Herz the use of the term representation (_Vorstellung_) undoubtedly helped to conceal this problem. It is now emphasised that appearances are nothing but sense representations, and must never be regarded as objects capable of existing in themselves, with exactly the same character, outside our power of representation. Now also Kant employs, in place of the phrase “in accord with,” the much more definite term “corresponding to.” He points out that when we speak of an object _corresponding_ to our knowledge, we imply that it is distinct from that knowledge. Consciousness of such an object must therefore be acquired from some other source than the given impressions. In other words, Kant is now prepared to withdraw his statement that “the passive or sensuous representations have an [easily] comprehensible relation to objects.” In and by themselves they are purely subjective, and can involve no such concept. The latter is a thought (_Gedanke_), a concept (_Begriff_), additional to, and distinct from, the given impressions. Its possibility, as regards both origin[762] and validity, must be “deduced.”