A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
Such is the form in which Kant’s pre-Critical doctrine of the
transcendental object survives in the _Critique_.[801] It contains no
trace of the teaching of the objective deduction of the first and second
edition or of the teaching of the refutation of idealism in the second
edition. It closely resembles Mill’s doctrine of the permanent
possibilities of sensation, and is almost equally subjectivist in
character. As already noted,[802] it also lies open to the further
objection that it involves an illegitimate application of the categories
to things in themselves. As Kant started from the naïve and natural
assumption that reference of representations to objects must be their
reference to things in themselves, he also took over the current
Cartesian view that it is by an inference in terms of the category of
causality that we advance from a representation to its cause. The thing
in itself is regarded as the sole true substance and as the real cause
of everything which happens in the natural world. Appearances, being
representations merely, are wholly transitory and completely
inefficacious. _Not only, therefore, are the categories regarded as
valid of things in themselves, they are also declared to have no
possible application to phenomena._ Sense appearances do not, on this
view, constitute the mechanical world of the natural sciences; they have
a purely subjective, more or less epi-phenomenal, existence in the mind
of each separate observer. It was very gradually, in the process of
developing his own Critical teaching, that Kant came to realise the very
different position to which he was thereby committed. The categories,
including that of causality, are pre-empted for the _empirical_ object
which is now regarded as immediately apprehended; and the function of
mediating the reference of phenomena to things in themselves now falls
to the Ideas of Reason. The distinction between appearance and reality
is no longer that between representations and their noumenal causes, but
between the limited and relative character of the entire world in space
and time and the unconditioned demanded by Reason. But these are
questions whose discussion must meantime be deferred.[803]