A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
The self-consciousness of the subjective deduction, in the preliminary
form above stated, is, however, itself empirical. Kant, developing on
more strictly Critical lines the argument which had accompanied his
earlier doctrine of the transcendental object, now proceeds to maintain
in what is at once the most fruitful and the most misleading of his
tenets, that the ultimate ground of the possibility of consciousness and
therefore also of empirical self-consciousness is the transcendental
unity of apperception. Such apperception, to use Kant’s ambiguous
phraseology, precedes experience as its _a priori_ condition. The
interpretation of given appearances through _a priori_ categories is a
necessity of consciousness because it is a condition of
self-consciousness; and it is a condition of self-consciousness because
it alone will account for the transcendental apperception upon which all
empirical self-consciousness ultimately depends.
One chief reason why Kant’s deduction is found so baffling and illusive
is that it rests upon an interpretation of the unity of apperception
which is very definitely drawn, but to which Kant himself gives only the
briefest and most condensed expression. I shall therefore take the
liberty of restating it in more explicit terms. The true or
transcendental self has no content of its own through which it can gain
knowledge of itself. It is mere identity, I am I. In other words,
self-consciousness is a mere _form_ through which contents that never
themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to
the self. Thus though the self in being conscious of time or duration
must be conscious of itself as _identical_ throughout the succession of
its experiences, that identity can never be discovered in those
experiences; it can only be thought as a condition of them. The
continuity of memory, for instance, is not a possible substitute for
transcendental apperception. As the subjective deduction demonstrates,
self-consciousness conditions memory, and cannot therefore be reduced to
or be generated by it.[892] When, however, such considerations are
allowed their due weight, the necessity of postulating a transcendental
unity becomes only the more evident. Though it can never itself be found
among appearances, it is an interpretation which we are none the less
compelled to give to appearances.