A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
There is no difficulty in accounting for analytic judgments. They can
all be justified by the principle of contradiction. Being analytic, they
can be established _a priori_. Nor, Kant here claims, is there any
difficulty in regard to synthetic judgments that are empirical. Though
the predicate is not contained in the subject concept, they belong to
each other (though accidentally) as parts of a given empirical whole.
Experience is the _x_ which lies beyond the concept A, and on which
rests the possibility of the synthesis of B with A. In regard, however,
to synthetic judgments which are likewise _a priori_, the matter is very
different. Hitherto, both by the sensationalists and by the
rationalists, all synthetic judgments have been regarded as empirical,
and all _a priori_ judgments as analytic. The only difference between
the opposed schools lies in the relative value which they ascribe to the
two types of judgment. For Hume the only really fruitful judgments are
the synthetic judgments _a posteriori_; analytic judgments are of quite
secondary value; they can never extend our knowledge, but only clarify
its existing content. For Leibniz, on the other hand, true knowledge
consists only in the analysis of our _a priori_ concepts, which he
regards as possessing an intrinsic and fruitful content; synthetic
judgments are always empirical, and as such are purely contingent.[152]
Thus for pre-Kantian philosophy analytic is interchangeable with _a
priori_, and synthetic with _a posteriori_. Kant’s Critical problem
arose from the startling discovery that the _a priori_ and the synthetic
do not exclude one another. A judgment may be synthetic and yet also _a
priori_. He appears to have made this discovery under the influence of
Hume, through study of the general principle of causality--every event
must have a cause.[153] In that judgment there seems to be no connection
of any kind discoverable between the subject (the conception of an event
as something happening in time) and the predicate (the conception of
another event preceding it as an originating cause); and yet we not
merely ascribe the one to the other but assert that they are necessarily
connected. We can conceive an event as sequent upon a preceding empty
time; none the less, in physical enquiry, the causal principle is
accepted as an established truth. Here, then, is a new and altogether
unique type of judgment, of thoroughly paradoxical nature. So entirely
is it without apparent basis, that Hume, who first deciphered its
strange character, felt constrained to ascribe our belief in it to an
unreasoning and merely instinctive, ‘natural’ habit or custom.