A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
Paulsen is justified in maintaining that Kant, in both editions of the
_Critique_, recognises the validity of mathematics and pure natural
science. The fact of their validity is less explicitly dwelt upon in the
first edition, but is none the less taken for granted. The sections
transferred from the _Prolegomena_ to the _Introduction_ of the second
edition make no essential change, except merely in the emphasis with
which Kant’s belief in the existence of valid _a priori_ synthetic
judgments is insisted upon. As has already been stated, only by virtue
of this initial assumption is Kant in position to maintain that there is
an alternative to the strict synthetic method. The _problem_ from which
he starts is common to both methods, and for that reason the formulation
used in the _Prolegomena_ can also be employed in the _Introduction_ to
the _Critique_. Only in their manner of solving the problem need they
differ.[180] Kant’s Critical problem first begins with this
presupposition of validity, and does not exist save through it.[181] He
does not first seek to discover whether such judgments are valid, and
then to explain them. He accepts them as valid, but develops a method of
argument which suffices for proof as well as for explanation. The
argument being directed to both points simultaneously, and establishing
both with equal cogency, it may legitimately be interpreted in either
way, merely as explanation, or also as proof. Kant does not profess or
attempt to keep exclusively to any one line of statement. Against the
dogmatists he insists upon the necessity of _explaining_ the validity of
_a priori_ synthetic judgments, against the sceptics upon the
possibility of _proving_ their validity. And constantly he uses
ambiguous terms, such as ‘justification’ (_Rechtfertigung_),
‘possibility,’ that may indifferently be read in either sense. But
though the fundamental demand which characterises the synthetic method
in its distinction from the analytic thus falls into the background, and
is only occasionally insisted upon, it is none the less fulfilled. So
far as regards the main argument of the _Critique_ in either edition,
the validity of synthetic _a priori_ judgments is not required as a
premiss. It is itself independently proved.