The _pleasant_, as motive of desire, is always of one and the same kind, no matter whence it comes and however specifically different the representation (of sense, and sensation objectively considered) may be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, account is taken only of the number of its charms (simultaneous and successive), and so only of the mass, as it were, of the pleasant sensation; and this can be made intelligible only by _quantity_. It has no reference to culture, but belongs to mere enjoyment.--On the other hand, the _beautiful_ requires the representation of a certain _quality_ of the Object, that can be made intelligible and reduced to concepts (although it is not so reduced in an aesthetical judgement); and it cultivates us, in that it teaches us to attend to the purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure.--The _sublime_ consists merely in the _relation_ by which the sensible in the representation of nature is judged available for a possible supersensible use.--The _absolutely good_, subjectively judged according to the feeling that it inspires (the Object of the moral feeling), as capable of determining the powers of the subject through the representation of an _absolutely compelling_ law, is specially distinguished by the _modality_ of a necessity that rests _a priori_ upon concepts. This necessity involves not merely a _claim_, but a _command_ for the assent of every one, and belongs in itself to the pure intellectual, rather than to the aesthetical Judgement; and is by a determinant and not a mere reflective judgement ascribed not to Nature but to Freedom. But the _determinability of the subject_ by means of this Idea, and especially of a subject that can feel _hindrances_ in sensibility, and at the same time its superiority to them by their subjugation involving a _modification of its state_--_i.e._ the moral feeling,--is yet so far cognate to the aesthetical Judgement and its formal conditions that it can serve to represent the conformity to law of action from duty as aesthetical, _i.e._ as sublime or even as beautiful, without losing its purity. This would not be so, if we were to put it in natural combination with the feeling of the pleasant. If we take the result of the foregoing exposition of the two kinds of aesthetical judgements, there arise therefrom the following short explanations: The _Beautiful_ is what pleases in the mere judgement (and therefore not by the medium of sensation in accordance with a concept of the Understanding). It follows at once from this that it must please apart from all interest. The _Sublime_ is what pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of sense.