We shall therefore only have to seek for the deduction of judgements of Taste, _i.e._ of judgements about the Beauty of natural things; we shall thus treat satisfactorily the problem with which the whole faculty of aesthetical Judgement is concerned. § 31. _Of the method of deduction of judgements of Taste_ A Deduction, _i.e._ the guarantee of the legitimacy of a class of judgements, is only obligatory if the judgement lays claim to necessity. This it does, if it demands even subjective universality or the agreement of every one, although it is not a judgement of cognition but only one of pleasure or pain in a given object; _i.e._ it assumes a subjective purposiveness thoroughly valid for every one, which must not be based on any concept of the thing, because the judgement is one of taste. We have before us in the latter case no cognitive judgement--neither a theoretical one based on the concept of a _Nature_ in general formed by the Understanding, nor a (pure) practical one based on the Idea of _Freedom_, as given _a priori_ by Reason. Therefore we have to justify _a priori_ the validity neither of a judgement which represents what a thing is, nor of one which prescribes that I ought to do something in order to produce it. We have merely to prove for the Judgement generally the _universal validity_ of a singular judgement that expresses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of the form of an object; in order to explain how it is possible that a thing can please in the mere act of judging it (without sensation or concept), and how the satisfaction of one man can be proclaimed as a rule for every other; just as the act of judging of an object for the sake of a _cognition_ in general has universal rules. If now this universal validity is not to be based on any collecting of the suffrages of others, or on any questioning of them as to the kind of sensations they have, but is to rest, as it were, on an autonomy of the judging subject in respect of the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), _i.e._ on his own taste, and yet is not to be derived from concepts; then a judgement like this--such as the judgement of taste is, in fact--has a twofold logical peculiarity. _First_, there is its _a priori_ universal validity, which is not a logical universality in accordance with concepts, but the universality of a singular judgement. _Secondly_, it has a necessity (which must always rest on _a priori_ grounds), which however does not depend on any _a priori_ grounds of proof, through the representation of which the assent that every one concedes to the judgement of taste could be exacted.