The judgement of taste is distinguished from a logical judgement in
this, that the latter subsumes a representation under the concept
of the Object, while the former does not subsume it under any
concept; because otherwise the necessary universal agreement [in
these judgements] would be capable of being enforced by proofs.
Nevertheless it is like the latter in this, that it claims universality
and necessity, though not according to concepts of the Object, and
consequently a merely subjective necessity. Now, because the concepts
in a judgement constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition
of the Object), but the judgement of taste is not determinable by
concepts, it is based only on the subjective formal condition of a
judgement in general. The subjective condition of all judgements is
the faculty of Judgement itself. This when used with reference to a
representation by which an object is given, requires the accordance
of two representative powers: viz. Imagination (for the intuition and
comprehension of the manifold) and Understanding (for the concept as
a representation of the unity of this comprehension). Now because no
concept of the Object lies here at the basis of the judgement, it can
only consist in the subsumption of the Imagination itself (in the case
of a representation by which an object is given) under the conditions
that the Understanding requires to pass from intuition to concepts.
That is, because the freedom of the Imagination consists in the fact
that it schematises without any concept, the judgement of taste must
rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocal activity of the Imagination
in its _freedom_ and the Understanding with its _conformity to law_.
It must therefore rest on a feeling, which makes us judge the object
by the purposiveness of the representation (by which an object is
given) in respect of the furtherance of the cognitive faculty in its
free play. Taste, then, as subjective Judgement, contains a principle
of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the _faculty_
of intuitions or presentations (_i.e._ the Imagination) under the
_faculty_ of the concepts (_i.e._ the Understanding); so far as the
former _in its freedom_ harmonises with the latter _in its conformity
to law_.
In order to discover this ground of legitimacy by a Deduction of the
judgements of taste we can only take as a clue the formal peculiarities
of this kind of judgements, and consequently can only consider their
logical form.
§ 36. _Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste_