For whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial beauty we can say generally: _That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of judging it_ (not in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept). Now art has always a definite design of producing something. But if this something were bare sensation (something merely subjective), which is to be accompanied with pleasure, the product would please in the act of judgement only by mediation of sensible feeling. And again, if the design were directed towards the production of a definite Object, then, if this were attained by art, the Object would only please by means of concepts. But in both cases the art would not please _in the mere act of judging_; _i.e._ it would not please as beautiful, but as mechanical. Hence the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although it is designed, must not seem to be designed; _i.e._ beautiful art must _look_ like nature, although we are conscious of it as art. But a product of art appears like nature when, although its agreement with the rules, according to which alone the product can become what it ought to be, is _punctiliously_ observed, yet this is not _painfully_ apparent; [the form of the schools does not obtrude itself][78]--it shows no trace of the rule having been before the eyes of the artist and having fettered his mental powers. § 46. _Beautiful Art is the art of genius_ _Genius_ is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art. Since talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to Nature, we may express the matter thus: _Genius_ is the innate mental disposition (_ingenium_) _through which_ Nature gives the rule to Art. Whatever may be thought of this definition, whether it is merely arbitrary or whether it is adequate to the concept that we are accustomed to combine with the word _genius_ (which is to be examined in the following paragraphs), we can prove already beforehand that according to the signification of the word here adopted, beautiful arts must necessarily be considered as arts of _genius_. For every art presupposes rules by means of which in the first instance a product, if it is to be called artistic, is represented as possible. But the concept of beautiful art does not permit the judgement upon the beauty of a product to be derived from any rule, which has a _concept_ as its determining ground, and therefore has at its basis a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Therefore, beautiful art cannot itself devise the rule according to which it can bring about its product. But since at the same time a product can never be called Art without some precedent rule, Nature in the subject must (by the harmony of its faculties) give the rule to Art; _i.e._ beautiful Art is only possible as a product of Genius.