But taste is merely a judging and not a productive faculty; and what is appropriate to it is not therefore a work of beautiful art. It may be only a product belonging to useful and mechanical art or even to science, produced according to definite rules that can be learned and must be exactly followed. But the pleasing form that is given to it is only the vehicle of communication, and a mode, as it were, of presenting it, in respect of which we remain free to a certain extent, although it is combined with a definite purpose. Thus we desire that table appointments, a moral treatise, even a sermon, should have in themselves this form of beautiful art, without it seeming to be _sought_: but we do not therefore call these things works of beautiful art. Under the latter class are reckoned a poem, a piece of music, a picture gallery, etc.; and in some would-be works of beautiful art we find genius without taste, while in others we find taste without genius. § 49. _Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius_ We say of certain products of which we expect that they should at least in part appear as beautiful art, they are without _spirit_[82]; although we find nothing to blame in them on the score of taste. A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit. A history may be exact and well arranged, but without spirit. A festal discourse may be solid and at the same time elaborate, but without spirit. Conversation is often not devoid of entertainment, but yet without spirit: even of a woman we say that she is pretty, an agreeable talker, and courteous, but without spirit. What then do we mean by spirit? _Spirit_, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating principle of the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the soul, the material which it applies to that [purpose], is that which puts the mental powers purposively into swing, _i.e._ into such a play as maintains itself and strengthens the [mental] powers in their exercise. Now I maintain that this principle is no other than the faculty of presenting _aesthetical Ideas_. And by an aesthetical Idea I understand that representation of the Imagination which occasions much thought, without, however, any definite thought, _i.e._ any _concept_, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language.--We easily see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of a _rational Idea_, which conversely is a concept to which no _intuition_ (or representation of the Imagination) can be adequate.