be incapable of existing together, and consequently a Dialectic arises which leads the Judgement into error in the principle of its reflection. The _first maxim_ of Judgement is the _proposition_: all production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws. The _second maxim_ is the _counter-proposition_: some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws. (To judge them requires quite a different law of causality, namely, that of final causes.) If these regulative principles of investigation be converted into constitutive principles of the possibility of Objects, they will run thus: _Proposition_: All production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws. _Counter-proposition_: Some production of material things is not possible according to merely mechanical laws. In this latter aspect, as objective principles for the determinant Judgement, they would contradict each other; and consequently one of the two propositions must necessarily be false. We shall then, it is true, have an antinomy, but not of Judgement; there will be a conflict in the legislation of Reason. Reason, however, can prove neither the one nor the other of these fundamental propositions, because we can have _a priori_ no determinant principle of the possibility of things according to mere empirical laws of nature. On the other hand, as regards the first-mentioned maxims of a reflective Judgement, they involve no contradiction in fact. For if I say, I must _judge_, according to merely mechanical laws, of the possibility of all events in material nature, and consequently of all forms regarded as its products, I do not therefore say: _They are possible in this way alone_ (apart from any other kind of causality). All that is implied is: I _must_ always _reflect_ upon them _according to the principle_ of the mere mechanism of nature, and consequently investigate this as far as I can; because unless this lies at the basis of investigation, there can be no proper knowledge of nature at all. But this does not prevent us, if occasion offers, from following out the second maxim in the case of certain natural forms (and even by occasion of these in the whole of nature), in order to reflect upon them according to the principle of final causes, which is quite a different thing from explaining them according to the mechanism of nature. Reflection in accordance with the first maxim is thus not abrogated; on the contrary, we are told to follow it as far as we can. Nor is it said that these forms would not be possible in accordance with the mechanism of nature. It is only asserted that _human Reason_ in following up this maxim and in this way could never find the least ground for that which constitutes the specific [character] of a natural purpose, although it would increase its knowledge of natural laws.