must be elaborated in order that its validity may be able to stand the strictest examination (even if we should be compelled to admit in one part the weakness of our rational insight). Thus it is the duty of the philosopher (supposing even that he counts as nothing the claims of sincerity) to expose the above illusion, however wholesome it is, which such a confusion can produce; and to distinguish what merely belongs to persuasion from that which leads to conviction (for these are determinations of assent which differ not merely in degree but in kind), in order to present plainly the state of the mind in this proof in its whole clearness, and to be able to subject it frankly to the closest examination. But a proof which is intended to convince, can again be of two kinds; either deciding what the object is _in itself_, or what it is _for us_ (for men in general) according to our necessary rational principles of judgement (proof κατ’ ἀλήθειαν or κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, the last word being taken in its universal signification of man in general). In the first case it is based on adequate principles for the determinant Judgement, in the second for the reflective Judgement. In the latter case it can never, when resting on merely theoretical principles, tend to conviction; but if a practical principle of Reason (which is therefore universally and necessarily valid) lies at its basis, it may certainly lay claim to conviction adequate in a pure practical point of view, _i.e._ to moral conviction. But a proof _tends to conviction_, though without convincing, if it is [merely][139] brought on the way thereto; _i.e._ if it contains in itself only objective grounds, which although not attaining to certainty are yet of such a kind that they do not serve merely for persuasion as subjective grounds of the judgement.[140] All theoretical grounds of proof resolve themselves either into: (1) Proofs by logically strict _Syllogisms of Reason_; or where this is not the case, (2) _Conclusions_ according to _analogy_; or where this also has no place, (3) _Probable opinion_; or finally, which has the least weight, (4) Assumption of a merely possible ground of explanation, _i.e._ _Hypothesis_.--Now I say that all grounds of proof in general, which aim at theoretical conviction, can bring about no belief of this kind from the highest to the lowest degree, if there is to be proved the proposition of the _existence_ of an original Being, as a God, in the signification adequate to the whole content of this concept; viz. a _moral_ Author of the world, by whom the final purpose of creation is at the same time supplied.