combination (_i.e._ for every man). EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE SECOND MOMENT The _beautiful_ is that which pleases universally, without a concept. THIRD MOMENT OF JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH ARE BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION THEREIN. § 10. _Of purposiveness in general_ If we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical like the feeling of pleasure) [we say that] the purpose is the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a _concept_ in respect of its _Object_ is its purposiveness (_forma finalis_). Where then not merely the cognition of an object, but the object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a purpose. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause and precedes it. The consciousness of the causality of a representation, for _maintaining_ the subject in the same state, may here generally denote what we call pleasure; while on the other hand pain is that representation which contains the ground of the determination of the state of representations into their opposite [of restraining or removing them[21]]. The faculty of desire, so far as it is determinable only through concepts, _i.e._ to act in conformity with the representation of a purpose, would be the Will. But an Object, or a state of mind, or even an action, is called purposive, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose, merely because its possibility can be explained and conceived by us only so far as we assume for its ground a causality according to purposes, _i.e._ a will which would have so disposed it according to the representation of a certain rule. There can be, then, purposiveness without[22] purpose, so far as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but yet can only make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves by deriving it from a will. Again, we are not always forced to regard what we observe (in respect of its possibility) from the point of view of Reason. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness according to form, without basing it on a purpose (as the material of the _nexus finalis_), and we can notice it in objects, although only by reflection. § 11. _The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the_ form of the purposiveness _of an object (or of its mode of representation)_