I can say of every representation that it is at least _possible_ that (as a cognition) it should be bound up with a pleasure. Of a representation that I call _pleasant_ I say that it _actually_ excites pleasure in me. But the _beautiful_ we think as having a _necessary_ reference to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a peculiar kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity; in which case it would be cognised _a priori_ that every one _will feel_ this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me. It is not a practical necessity; in which case, by concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings, the satisfaction is the necessary result of an objective law and only indicates that we absolutely (without any further design) ought to act in a certain way. But the necessity which is thought in an aesthetical judgement can only be called _exemplary_; _i.e._ a necessity of the assent of _all_ to a judgement which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state. Since an aesthetical judgement is not an objective cognitive judgement, this necessity cannot be derived from definite concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (of a complete agreement of judgements as to the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly furnish sufficiently numerous vouchers for this; but also, on empirical judgements we can base no concept of the necessity of these judgements. § 19. _The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgement of taste, is conditioned_ The judgement of taste requires the agreement of every one; and he who describes anything as beautiful claims that every one _ought_ to give his approval to the object in question and also describe it as beautiful. The _ought_ in the aesthetical judgement is therefore pronounced in accordance with all the data which are required for judging and yet is only conditioned. We ask for the agreement of every one else, because we have for it a ground that is common to all; and we could count on this agreement, provided we were always sure that the case was correctly subsumed under that ground as rule of assent. § 20. _The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense_