something, but that it is a characteristic of things perceived, which he _calls_ phenomena, and which _are_ bodies. But, since in his statement of this fact he substitutes for bodies phenomena, which to him are perceptions, his statement can be put in the form 'space is _the form of perceptions_'; and the statement in this form is verbally almost identical with the statement that space is _a form of perception_. Consequently, the latter statement, which _should_ mean that space is a way in which we perceive things, is easily identified with a statement of which the meaning is that space is a characteristic of something perceived.[12] [9] Cf. p. 51, note 1. [10] Cf. p. 30 and ff. [11] Cf. p. 39. [12] It can be shown in the same way, _mutatis mutandis_ (cp. p. 111), that the view that time, though the form of inner perception, is a characteristic of a reality gains plausibility from Kant's implicit treatment of our states as appearances due to ourselves. Again, Kant's account of time will be found to treat something represented or perceived as also a perception. We find two consecutive paragraphs[13] of which the aim is apparently to establish the contrary conclusions: (1) that time is only the form of our internal state and not of external phenomena, and (2) that time is the formal condition of all phenomena, external and internal. [13] B. 49-50 (b) and (c), M. 30 (b) and (c). To establish the first conclusion, Kant argues that time has nothing to do with shape or position, but, on the contrary, determines the relation of representations in our internal state. His meaning is that we have a succession of perceptions or representations of bodies in space,[14] and that while the bodies perceived are not related temporally, our perceptions or representations of them are so related. Here 'representations' refers to our apprehension, and is distinguished from what is represented, viz. bodies in space. [14] Kant here refers to bodies by the term 'phenomena', but their character as phenomena is not relevant to his argument. How, then, does Kant reach the second result? He remembers that bodies in space are 'phenomena', i. e. representations. He is, therefore, able to point out that all representations belong, as determinations of the mind, to our internal state, whether they have external things, i. e. bodies in space, for their objects or not, and that, consequently, they are subject to time. Hence time is concluded to be the form of all phenomena. In this second argument, however, it is clear that Kant has passed from his previous treatment of bodies in space as something represented or perceived to the treatment of them as themselves representations or perceptions.[15]