is effected by the pure understanding by means of its pure or a priori conceptions, i. e. the categories. This, then, is the process by which _a priori_ knowledge is originated. The activity of thought or understanding, however, which unites two conceptions in a judgement by analysis of them--this being the act studied by Formal Logic--is the same as that which gives unity to the synthesis of the pure manifold of perception--this being the act studied by Transcendental Logic. Consequently, 'the same understanding, and indeed by the same activities whereby in dealing with conceptions it unifies them in a judgement by an act of analysis, introduces by means of the synthetical unity which it produces in the pure manifold of perception a content into its own conceptions, in consequence of which these conceptions are called pure conceptions of the understanding,'[4] and we are entitled to say _a priori_ that these conceptions apply to objects because they are involved in the process by which we acquire _a priori_ knowledge of objects.' [4] An interpretation of B. 105 init., M. 63 fin. A discussion of the various difficulties raised by the general drift of this passage, as well as by its details,[5] is unnecessary, and would anticipate discussion of the _Transcendental Deduction_. But it is necessary to draw attention to three points. [5] E. g. Kant's arbitrary assertion that the operation of counting presupposes the conception of that number which forms the scale of notation adopted as the source of the unity of the synthesis. This is of course refuted among other ways by the fact that a number of units less than the scale of notation can be counted.