phenomena exist only relatively to the subject, so far as it has senses. To things in themselves their conformity to law would necessarily also belong independently of an understanding which knows them. But phenomena are only representations of things which exist unknown in respect of what they may be in themselves. But, as mere representations, they stand under no law of connexion except that which the connecting faculty prescribes."[98] [94] A. 125, Mah. 214. [95] A. 127, Mah. 216. [96] _Inbegriff._ [97] A. 114, Mah. 206. [98] B. 164, M. 100. In the second place, this last paragraph contains the real reason from the point of view of the deduction[99] of the categories for what may be called the negative side of his doctrine, viz. that the categories only apply to objects of experience and not to things in themselves. According to Kant, we can only say that certain principles of connexion apply to a reality into which we introduce the connexion. Things in themselves, if connected, are connected in themselves and apart from us. Hence there can be no guarantee that any principles of connexion which we might assert them to possess are those which they do possess. [99] The main passage (B. 146-9, M. 90-2), in which he argues that the categories do not apply to things in themselves, ignores the account of a conception as a principle of synthesis, upon which the deduction turns, and returns to the earlier account of a conception as something opposed to a perception, i. e. as that by which an object is thought as opposed to a perception by which an object is given. Consequently, it argues merely that the categories, as conceptions, are empty or without an object, unless an object is given in perception, and that, since things in themselves are not objects of perception, the categories are no more applicable to things in themselves than are any other conceptions. CHAPTER IX GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES The preceding account of Kant's vindication of the categories has included much criticism. But the criticism has been as far as possible restricted to details, and has dealt with matters of principle only so far as has been necessary in order to follow Kant's thought. We must now consider the position as a whole, even though this may involve some repetition.[1] The general difficulties of the position may be divided into two kinds, (1) difficulties involved in the working out of the theory, even if its main principles are not questioned, and (2) difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at all. [1] Difficulties connected with Kant's view of self-consciousness will be ignored, as having been sufficiently considered.