the thought of 100, which concerns the points. In the second place, although the thought of time is involved in the schema, the succession in question lies not in the object, but in our act of construction or apprehension. In the third place, the schema presupposes the corresponding conception and the process of schematizing directly brings the manifold of perception under the conception. Thus the thought of combining 10 groups of 10 units to make 100 presupposes the thought of 100, and the process of combination brings the units under the conception of 100. [7] Cf. pp. 240-1. The mistake is, of course, facilitated by the fact that 'objects in nature', being for Kant only 'appearances', resemble mental images more closely than they do as usually conceived. [8] Cf. B. 176, M. 107. That individuals are really referred to is also implied in the assertion that 'the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single _perception_, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility'. (The italics are mine.) [9] Two sentences treat individual objects and images as if they might be mentioned indifferently. "An object of experience or an image of it always falls short of the empirical conception to a far greater degree than does the schema." "The conception of a 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can draw the general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal without being limited to any single particular form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself _in concreto_."