The principles to be established relate to the two kinds of temporal relation apprehended in the world of nature, viz. coexistence and succession. The _method_ of proof, which is to be gathered from the proofs themselves rather than from Kant's general remarks[2] on the subject, is the same in each case. Kant expressly rejects any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions', e. g. any attempt to show that the very conception of change presupposes the thought of an identical subject of change.[3] The proof is transcendental in character, i. e. it argues that the principle to be established is a condition of the possibility of _apprehending_ the temporal relation in question, e. g. that the existence of a permanent subject of change is presupposed in any _apprehension_ of change. It assumes that we become aware of sequences and coexistences in the world of nature by a process which begins with a succession of mere perceptions, i. e. perceptions which are so far not the perceptions of a sequence or of a coexistence or indeed of anything;[4] and it seeks to show that this process involves an appeal to one of the principles in question--the particular principle involved depending on the temporal relation apprehended--and consequently, that since we do apprehend this temporal relation, which, as belonging to the world of nature, must be distinct from any temporal relation of our perceptions, the principle appealed to is valid. [2] B. 218-24, M. 132-6; and B. 262-5, M. 159-61. [3] B. 263-4, M. 160-1; B. 289, M. 174-5. [4] This assumption is of course analogous to the assumption which underlies the _Transcendental Deduction of the Categories_, that knowledge begins with the successive origination in us of isolated data of sense. The proof of the first analogy is given somewhat differently in the first edition, and in a passage added in the second. The earlier version, which is a better expression of the attitude underlying Kant's general remarks on the analogy, is as follows: