He implies, therefore, that the object of a conception can be said to be possible only when the conception is the apprehension of a complex of elements together with the apprehension--which, if not _a priori_, must be based upon experience--that they are connected. Hence a conception may be regarded as 'objectively real', or as 'fictitious' according as it is the apprehension of a complex of elements accompanied by the apprehension that they are connected, or the apprehension of a complex of elements not so accompanied. [4] The view that 'in the mere conception of a thing no sign of its existence is to be found' (B. 272, M. 165) forms, of course, the basis of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Cf. _Dialectic_, Bk. II, Ch. III, § 4. [5] Cf. 'a conception which includes in itself a synthesis' (B. 267 med., M. 162 med.). [6] E. g. B. 269 fin., M. 163 fin.; B. 270 med., M. 164 init. The formulation which really expresses Kant's thought is to be found B. 266 med., M. 161 fin.; B. 268 init., M. 162 fin.; B. 268 med., M. 163 init.; and B. 270 med., M. 164 init. [7] _Gedichtete._ [8] B. 268 init., M. 162 fin. [9] B. 269-70, M. 163-4. It is now possible to state Kant's problem more precisely. With regard to a given complex conception he wishes to determine the way in which we can answer the questions (1) 'Has the conception a possible object to correspond to it', or, in other words, 'Is the conception 'objectively real' or 'fictitious'?' (2) 'Given that a corresponding object is possible, is it also real?' (3) 'Given that it is real, is it also necessary?'