1.—=Constitutional Law.= Let us take in the first place the public
law of the state (_jus civitatis_), particularly in its application
to matters within the state. Here a question arises which many think
difficult to answer, but which the transcendental principle of
publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a legitimate means for
a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive
yoke of a so-called tyrant (_non titulo, sed exercitio talis_)?”
The rights of a nation are violated in a government of this kind,
and no wrong is done to the tyrant in dethroning him. Of this there
is no doubt. None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of
the subjects to prosecute their rights in this way; and they would
be just as little justified in complaining, if they happened to be
defeated in their attempt and had to endure the severest punishment
in consequence.
A great many reasons for and against both sides of this question
may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic deduction
of the principles of right. But the transcendental principle
of the publicity of public right can spare itself this diffuse
argumentation. For, according to that principle, the people would
ask themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they
could venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a
favourable opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear
that if, when a constitution is established, it were made a
condition that force may be exercised against the sovereign under
certain circumstances, the people would be obliged to claim a
lawful authority higher than his. But in that case, the so-called
sovereign would be no longer sovereign: or, if both powers, that of
the sovereign and that of the people, were made a condition of the
constitution of the state, then its establishment (which was the aim
of the people) would be impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is
quite obvious from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which
justify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim
impossible. We are obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy
would not be necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may
say quite plainly that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be
punished by death, even although they may hold that it was he who
first transgressed the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious
of possessing irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed
in every civil constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to
protect any individual member of the nation against his neighbour
has also not the right to exercise authority over him), then he need
have no fear that making known the maxims which guide him will cause
the defeat of his plans. And it is quite consistent with this view
to hold that, if the people are successful in their insurrection,
the sovereign must return to the rank of a subject, and refrain from