An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery
of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is
evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any
other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any
impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most
reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of
Himself; as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so
incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first
void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong
presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as
I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any
other.
19. Idea of Substance not innate.
I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for
mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that
is the idea of SUBSTANCE; which we neither have nor can have by
sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas,
we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we
cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since,
by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is
not, we have no such clear idea at all; and therefore signify nothing
by the word SUBSTANCE but only an uncertain supposition of we know not
what, i. e. of something whereof we have no idea, which we take to be
the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.
20. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.