An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
signs of what is, and of what ought to be, that are presented in our
ideas and words (logica).
CHAPTER I.
OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.
1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only.
Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other
immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can
contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about
them.
2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two
Ideas.
KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but THE PERCEPTION OF THE
CONNEXION OF AND AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT AND REPUGNANCY OF ANY OF OUR
IDEAS. In this alone it consists.
Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not,
there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short
of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we
else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess
ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but
perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and
is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?
3. This Agreement or Disagreement may be any of four sorts.
But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or
disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:
I. IDENTITY, or DIVERSITY. II. RELATION. III. CO-EXISTENCE, or NECESSARY
CONNEXION. IV. REAL EXISTENCE.
4. First, Of Identity, or Diversity in ideas.