An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
THIRDLY, Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and
discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for
want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want of
finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of
agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are
ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their
faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of
application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those
ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our
ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements,
one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is
impossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the
agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts
flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain
significations. Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names,
and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas
themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them,
have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and
confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of
knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain
signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain
from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This
having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters,
the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very
little, in proportion to the schools disputes, and writings, the world
has been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of
words, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were
advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of
knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as they
have in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity
of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation
and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and
disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught
us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much
unknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But
having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is
commonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here.
31. Extent of Human Knowledge in respect to its Universality.