An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly
stand for, are collections of such qualities as have been observed to
co-exist in an unknown substratum, which we call substance; but what
other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot
certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which,
in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in
all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all: for
the reasons mentioned, chap. iii. Viz. 1. Because we know not the
real constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality
particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for
experimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no
further than that bare instance: because our understandings can
discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any
modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones. And therefore there
are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances,
which can carry with them undoubted certainty.
8. Instance in Gold.
'All gold is fixed,' is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain
of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the
useless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold to
stand for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essence
belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular substances
are of that species; and so cannot with certainty affirm anything
universally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species determined
by its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be the
complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible,
and heavier than any other known;--in this proper use of the word gold,
there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. But yet no other
quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold,
but what hath a DISCOVERABLE connexion or inconsistency with that
nominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connexion
that we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simple
idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it is
impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition,
that all gold is fixed.
9. No discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold, and
other simple ideas.