An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
II. Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss, because of the obscurity,
confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there
we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any
perfect idea of the LEAST EXTENSION OF MATTER, nor of INFINITY, we are
at a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear,
and distinct ideas of NUMBER, our reason meets with none of those
inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any
contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the
operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought how
the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the
operation of God, run into great difficulties about FREE CREATED AGENTS,
which reason cannot well extricate itself out of.
11. III. Thirdly, Because we perceive not intermediate Ideas to show
conclusions.
Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas,
which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or
disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's faculties
far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of
human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of
the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear
to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than
human.
12. IV. Fourthly, Because we often proceed upon wrong Principles.
The mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in
absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions,
without knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to
implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and
reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from
clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations
brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more,
and engages him deeper in perplexities.
13. V. Fifthly, Because we often employ doubtful Terms.
As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the
same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses
and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and
bring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and not
the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless
obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are
everywhere observable.
14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning.