An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of,
and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other
together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I
mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either
of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no
other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning,
or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish
men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the
multitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the
attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of
former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: other
men have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is said,)
and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more
justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up
by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many
points, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but
see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in
the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it
was the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the
doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is
not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground.
There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a
man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is
in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18.
Not so many men in Errors as is commonly supposed.