Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius — Niccolo Machiavelli — John Shaqi
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
Niccolo Machiavelli · en
Now, to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders, there is
no more potent, effectual, wholesome, and necessary remedy than _to
slay the sons of Brutus_. They, as the historian tells us, were along
with other young Romans led to conspire against their country, simply
because the unusual privileges which they had enjoyed under the kings,
were withheld under the consuls; so that to them it seemed as though
the freedom of the people implied their servitude. Any one, therefore,
who undertakes to control a people, either as their prince or as the
head of a commonwealth, and does not make sure work with all who are
hostile to his new institutions, founds a government which cannot last
long. Undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy, who, to
secure their position, are forced to advance by unusual and irregular
paths, and with the people for their enemies. For while he who has to
deal with a few adversaries only, can easily and without much or
serious difficulty secure himself, he who has an entire people against
him can never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses the weaker
his authority becomes; so that his best course is to strive to make the
people his friends.
But since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above,
treating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have
to return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it
briefly. Speaking, then of those princes who have become the tyrants of
their country, I say that the prince who seeks to gain over an
unfriendly people should first of all examine what it is the people
really desire, and he will always find that they desire two things:
first, to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their servitude;
and second, to regain their freedom. The first of these desires the
prince can gratify wholly, the second in part. As regards the former,
we have an instance exactly in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea,
being in exile, it so happened that on a feud arising between the
commons and the nobles of that city, the latter, perceiving they were
weaker than their adversaries, began to look with favour on Clearchus,
and conspiring with him, in opposition to the popular voice recalled
him to Heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom. Clearchus
finding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the nobles, whom
he could in no way either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the
people, who could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved
to rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and
recommend himself to the people. Wherefore, watching his opportunity,
he caused all the nobles to be put to death, and thus, to the extreme
delight of the people, satisfied one of those desires by which they are
possessed, namely, the desire for vengeance.